The Autoepistemic Logic of Knowledge and Belief (AELB) is a powerful nonmonotonic formalism introduced by Teodor Przymusinski in 1994. In this paper, we specialize it to a class of theories called "super logic programs". We argue that these programs form a natural generalization of standard logic programs. In particular, they allow disjunctions and default negation of arbitrary positive objective formulas.
INTRODUCTION
The relationship between logic programs and nonmonotonic knowledge representation formalisms can be briefly summarized as follows. Any nonmonotonic formalism for knowledge representation has to contain some form of default negation, whether it is defined as an explicit negation operator or is implicitly present in the form of beliefs, disbeliefs or defaults. Since the main difference between logic programs and classical (monotonic) logic is the presence of default negation, logic programs can be viewed as the simplest nonmonotonic extension of classical monotonic logic.
However, standard logic programs suffer from some important limitations. Most importantly, they are unable to handle disjunctive information. 1 Yet, in natural discourse as well as in various programming applications we often use disjunctive statements. One particular example of such a situation is reasoning by cases. Other obvious examples include:
(1) Approximate information: for instance, an age "around 30" can be 28, 29, 30, 31, or 32; (2) Legal rules: the judge always has some freedom for his/her decision, otherwise he/she would not be needed; so laws cannot have unique models; (3) Diagnosis: we may know exactly which part of some machine was faulty only at the end of a fault diagnosis; but as long as we are searching, different possibilities exist; (4) Biological inheritance: if the parents have blood groups A and 0, the child must also have one of these two blood groups (example from Lipski [1979] ); (5) Natural language understanding: here there are many possibilities for ambiguity and they are represented most naturally by multiple intended models; (6) Reasoning about concurrent processes: since we do not know the exact sequence in which certain operations are performed, multiple models come into play; (7) Conflicts in multiple inheritance: if we want to keep as much information as possible, we should assume the disjunction of the inherited values [Brass and Lipeck 1993] .
Disjunctive logic programming was used for example in the following projects for real applications:
(1) In the DisLoP project ], a logical description of a system together with a particular observation is transformed into a disjunctive program so that an interpreter for disjunctive logic programs can compute the minimal diagnosis ].
(2) The view update problem in deductive and relational databases can also be transformed into a problem of computing minimal models of disjunctive programs [Aravindan and Baumgartner 1997 ]. (3) Another important application of disjunctive techniques in the database area is to glue together different heterogeneous databases to provide a single unified view to the user. With the ever expanding World Wide Web technology, millions and millions of data in thousands of different formats are thrown at a user who clearly needs some tools to put together information of interest to him. In Schäfer and Neugebauer [1997] and it is shown how disjunctive logic programs can be used as mediators and thus as important tools to create a powerful query language for accessing the web. (4) In Thomas [1996, 1998] disjunctive logic programming was used for analyzing rule sets for calculating banking fees. A credit institution sells stocks and shares to its customers and charges their accounts. The fee depends on the value of the transaction, the customer type and various other parameters. All this is formulated in a set of rules in natural language. The problem is to translate this rule set into a formal language and then to analyze its various properties. For example does the rule set allow us to calculate a fee for each business deal? Is that fee unique? A straightforward translation into propositional logic, then use of a theorem prover did not work. However, it turned out that using disjunctive logic programs solved the problem Thomas 1996, 1998 ].
Formalisms promoting disjunctive reasoning are more expressive and natural to use since they permit direct translation of disjunctive statements from natural language and from informal specifications. Consequently, considerable interest and research effort 2 has been recently given to the problem of finding a suitable extension of the logic programming paradigm beyond the class of normal logic programs that would ensure a proper treatment of disjunctive information. However, the problem of finding a suitable semantics for disjunctive programs and deductive databases proved to be far more complex than it is in the case of normal, nondisjunctive programs. 3 We believe that in order to demonstrate that a class of programs can be justifiably called an extension of logic programs one should be able to argue that:
(1) the proposed syntax of such programs resembles the syntax of logic programs but applies to a significantly broader class of programs including the class of disjunctive logic programs as well as the class of logic programs with strong (or "classical") negation [Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991; Alferes et al. 1998 ];
(2) the proposed semantics of such programs constitutes an intuitively natural extension of one or more well-established semantics of normal logic programs; (3) there exists a reasonably simple procedural mechanism allowing, at least in principle, to compute the semantics 4 ; (4) the proposed class of programs and their semantics is a special case of a more general nonmonotonic formalism that would clearly link it to other well-established nonmonotonic formalisms.
In this paper we propose a specific class of such extended logic programs that will be (immodestly) called super logic programs or just super programs. We will argue that the class of super programs satisfies all of the above conditions, and in addition is sufficiently flexible to allow various application-dependent extensions and modifications. It includes all (monotonic) propositional theories, all disjunctive logic programs and all extended logic programs with strong negation. We also provide a description of an implementation of a query-answering interpreter for the class of super programs that is available on the World Wide Web. 5 The class of super logic programs is closely related to other nonmonotonic formalisms. In fact, super logic programs constitute a special case of a yet more expressive nonmonotonic formalism called the Autoepistemic Logic of Knowledge and Beliefs, AELB, introduced earlier in Przymusinski [1994, 1998] . The logic AELB isomorphically includes the well known nonmonotonic formalisms of Moore's Autoepistemic Logic and McCarthy's Circumscription. Through this embedding, the semantics of super logic programs is clearly linked to other well established nonmonotonic formalisms.
At the same time, as we demonstrate in this paper, in spite of their increased expressiveness, super logic programs still admit natural and simple query answering mechanisms that can be easily implemented and tested. We discuss one such existing implementation in this paper. Needless to say, the problem of finding suitable inference mechanisms, capable to model human common sense reasoning, is one of the major research and implementation problems in Artificial Intelligence.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall the definition and basic properties of nonmonotonic knowledge bases, and we introduce the class of super logic programs as a special subclass of them. We also establish basic properties of super programs. In Sections 3 and 4 we describe two characterizations of the semantics of super programs, one of which is syntactic and the other model-theoretic. Due to the restricted nature of super programs, these characterizations are significantly simpler than those applicable to arbitrary nonmonotonic knowledge bases. In Section 5 we describe our implementation of a query-answering interpreter for super programs, which is based on the previously established model-theoretic characterization of their semantics. Section 6 mentions related work. We conclude with some final remarks in Section 7. For the sake of readability, most proofs are contained in the Appendix.
In the theoretical parts of this paper, we restrict our attention to propositional programs. Since we can always consider a propositional instantiation of the program, this does not limit the generality of the obtained results from a semantic standpoint. Of course, many practical applications need rules with variables. The current version of our interpreter for super-logic programs already supports variables that satisfy the allowedness/range-restriction condition: Every variable that occurs in a rule must also appear in at least one positive body literal of the rule. Then an intelligent grounding mechanism can be applied, see Section 5.
SUPER LOGIC PROGRAMS
We first define the notion of a nonmonotonic knowledge base. Super logic programs are special knowledge bases.
The language is based on the Autoepistemic Logic of Knowledge and Beliefs, AELB, introduced in Przymusinski [1994, 1998] . However, in this paper we use the default negation operator not instead of the belief operator B. Actually, not F can be seen as an abbreviation for B(¬F ), so this is only a slight syntactic variant. 6 Consequently, all of our results apply to the original AELB as well. First, let us briefly recall the basic definitions of AELB.
Syntax
Consider a fixed propositional language L with standard connectives (∨, ∧, ¬, →, ←, ↔) and the propositional letters true and false. We denote the set of its propositions by At L . Extend the language L to a propositional modal language L not by augmenting it with a modal operator not , called the default negation operator. The formulae of the form not F , where F is an arbitrary formula of L not , are called default negation atoms or just default atoms and are considered to be atomic formulae in the extended propositional modal language L not . The formulae of the original language L are called objective, and the elements of At L are called objective atoms. Any propositional theory in the modal language L not will be called a nonmonotonic knowledge base (or "knowledge base" for short):
Definition 2.1 (Nonmonotonic Knowledge Bases). By a nonmonotonic knowledge base we mean an arbitrary (possibly infinite) theory in the propositional language L not . By using standard logical equivalences, the theory can • S. Brass et al. be transformed into a set of clauses of the form:
where m, n, k, l ≥ 0, A i 's and B i 's are objective atoms and F i 's and G i 's are arbitrary formulae of L not . By an affirmative knowledge base we mean any such theory all of whose clauses satisfy the condition that k = 0.
By a rational knowledge base we mean any such theory all of whose clauses satisfy the condition that l = 0.
In other words, affirmative knowledge bases are precisely those theories that satisfy the condition that all of their clauses contain at least one objective atom in their heads. This means that one cannot derive contradictions, and there is at least one propositional model. Rational knowledge bases are those theories that do not contain any default atoms not F i in heads of their clauses. Intuitively, this means that default negation is defined only by the static semantics, and not by the clauses of the program (not is a kind of "built-in predicate"). Observe that an arbitrarily deep level of nested default negations is allowed in the language L not .
Super logic programs are a subclass of nonmonotonic knowledge bases. There are three restrictions:
(1) Only rational knowledge bases are allowed (i.e. no default negation in the head).
(2) Nested default negation is excluded.
(3) Default negation can only be applied to positive formulas, for example not (¬ p) and not ( p → q) cannot be used in super logic programs.
Definition 2.2 (Super Logic Programs). A Super Logic Program (or "super program") is a nonmonotonic knowledge base consisting of (possibly infinitely many) super-clauses of the form:
where F , G, and H are arbitrary positive objective formulae (i.e. formulae that can be represented as a disjunction of conjunctions of atoms).
In Proposition 2.5, it will be shown that simpler clauses can be used equivalently. However, one does not need a rule/clause form, but any formula can be permitted that is equivalent to such clauses. Our current implementation accepts all formulae that satisfy the following two conditions:
(1) inside not only ∨, ∧, and objective atoms are used, and (2) not does not appear in positive context: -An atom A (objective atom or default negation atom) appears in the propositional formula A in positive context.
is any formula). The same holds for "positive" replaced by "negative".
-If A appears in F in positive context, it appears in ¬F , F → G, G ← F , F ↔ G, G ↔ F in negative context (where G is any formula). The same holds with "positive" and "negative" exchanged.
Clearly the class of super programs contains all (monotonic) propositional theories and is syntactically significantly broader than the class of normal logic programs. In fact, it is somewhat broader than the class of programs usually referred to as disjunctive logic programs because:
(1) It allows constraints, that is, headless rules. In particular it allows the addition of strong negation to such programs, as shown in Section 2.6, by assuming the strong negation axioms ← A ∧ -A , which themselves are program rules (rather than meta-level constraints).
(2) It allows premises of the form not C, where C is not just an atom but a conjunction of atoms. This proves useful when reasoning with default assumptions that themselves are rules, such as not (man ∧ -human), which can be interpreted as stating that we can assume by default that every man is a human (note that -human represents strong negation of human). 7
Implication in the Modal Logic
The semantics of super logic programs can be seen as an instance of the semantics of arbitrary nonmonotonic knowledge bases, which we introduce now. AELB assumes the following two simple axiom schemata and one inference rule describing the arguably obvious properties of default atoms 8 :
(CA) Consistency Axiom. not ( false) and ¬not ( true) (1) (DA) Distributive Axiom. For any formulae F and G:
(IR) Invariance Inference Rule. For any formulae F and G:
The consistency axiom (CA) states that false is assumed to be false by default but true is not. The second axiom (DA) states that default negation not is distributive with respect to disjunctions. The invariance inference rule (IR) states that if two formulae are known to be equivalent then so are their default negations. In other words, the meaning of not F does not depend on the specific form of the formula F , for example, the formula not (F ∧ ¬F ) is equivalent to not (false) and thus is true by (CA).
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We do not assume the distributive axiom for conjunction: not (F ∧ G) ↔ not F ∨ not G. This would conflict with the intended meaning of not (falsity in all minimal models), see Remark 2.15.
Of course, besides the above axioms and inference rule, propositional consequences can also be used. The simplest way to define this is via propositional models. A (propositional) interpretation of L not is a mapping
we simply treat the formulas not (F ) as new propositions. Therefore, the notion of a model carries over from propositional logic. A formula F ∈ L not is a propositional consequence of T ⊆ L not if and only if for every interpretation I:
In the examples, we will represent models by sets of literals showing the truth values of only those objective and default atoms that are relevant to our considerations.
Definition 2.3 (Derivable Formulae). For any knowledge base T we denote by Cn not (T ) the smallest set of formulae of the language L not that contains T , all (substitution instances of) the axioms (CA) and (DA), and is closed under both propositional consequence and the invariance rule (IR).
We say that a formula F is derivable from the knowledge base T if F belongs to Cn not (T ). We denote this fact by
The following technical lemma follows by transliteration from a lemma stated in for AELB: PROPOSITION 2.4. For any knowledge base T and any formula F of L not :
(1) T not (not F → ¬not ¬F ) (2) If T not F then T not not ¬F .
Since the operator not obeys the distributive law for disjunction (DA), the default atom not H in the super logic program rules can be replaced by the conjunction not C 1 ∧ . . . ∧ not C n of default atoms not C i , where each of the C i s is a conjunction of objective atoms. Together with standard logical equivalences, this allows us to establish the following useful fact: PROPOSITION 2.5. A super logic program P can be equivalently defined as a set of (possibly infinitely many) clauses of the form:
where A i 's and B i 's are objective atoms and C i 's are conjunctions of objective atoms. If k = 0, for all clauses of P , then the program is called affirmative.
Intended Meaning of Default Negation: Minimal Models
As the name indicates, nonmonotonic knowledge bases must be equipped with a nonmonotonic semantics. Intuitively this means that we need to provide a meaning to the default negation atoms not F . We want the intended meaning of default atoms not F to be based on the principle of predicate minimization [McCarthy 1980; Minker 1982; Gelfond et al. 1989] : not F holds if ¬F is minimally entailed or, equivalently: not F holds if F is false in all minimal models.
In order to make this intended meaning precise we first have to define what we mean by a minimal model of a knowledge base.
Definition 2.6 (Minimal Models). A model M is smaller than a model N if it contains the same default atoms but has fewer objective atoms:
By a minimal model of a knowledge base T we mean a model M of T with the property that there is no smaller model N of T . If a formula F is true in all minimal models of T then we write T |= min F and say that F is minimally entailed by T .
In other words, minimal models are obtained by first assigning arbitrary truth values to the default atoms and then minimizing the objective atoms (see also You and Yuan [1993] ). For readers familiar with circumscription, this means that we are considering circumscription CIRC(T ; At L ) of the knowledge base T in which objective atoms are minimized while the default atoms not F are fixed:
Example 2.7. Consider the following simple knowledge base T : → car. car ∧ not broken → runs.
Let us prove that T minimally entails ¬broken, that is, T |= min ¬broken. Indeed, in order to find minimal models of T we need to assign an arbitrary truth value to the only default atom not broken, and then minimize the objective atoms broken, car and runs. We easily see that T has the following two minimal models (truth values of the remaining belief atoms are irrelevant and are therefore omitted):
M 1 = {not broken, car, runs, ¬broken}; M 2 = {¬not broken, car, ¬runs, ¬broken}.
Since in both of them car is true, and broken is false, we deduce that T |= min car and T |= min ¬broken.
Static Expansions
The semantics of arbitrary knowledge bases is defined by means of static expansions. The characterizations given in Sections 3 and 4 show that for the subclass of super logic programs, simpler definitions are possible. However, in order to prove the equivalence (and to appreciate the simplication), we first need to repeat the original definition (adepted to use not instead of B). As in Moore's Autoepistemic Logic, the intended meaning of default negation atoms in nonmonotonic knowledge bases is enforced by defining suitable expansions of such knowledge bases.
Definition 2.8 (Static Expansions of Knowledge Bases). A knowledge base T is called a static expansion of a knowledge base T if it satisfies the following fixed-point equation:
where F ranges over all formulae of L not .
A static expansion T of T must therefore coincide with the knowledge base obtained by: (i) adding to T the default negation not F of every formula F that is false in all minimal models of T , and, (ii) closing the resulting database under the consequence operator Cn not .
As the following proposition shows, the definition of static expansions enforces the intended meaning of default atoms. The implication "⇐" is a direct consequence of the definition; the direction "⇒" holds for rational knowledge bases 9 and thus super logic programs. The proposition is proven in Przymusinski [ , 1998 : PROPOSITION 2.9 (SEMANTICS OF DEFAULT NEGATION). Let T be a static expansion of a rational knowledge base T . For any formula F of L not we have:
It turns out that every knowledge base T has the least (in the sense of settheoretic inclusion) static expansion T that has an iterative definition as the least fixed point of the monotonic 10 default closure operator:
where S is an arbitrary knowledge base and the F 's range over all formulae of L not . The following proposition is a transliteration of a theorem from Przymusinski [ , 1995b Przymusinski [ , 1998 ]. In Section 3 we will show that it is sufficient to consider only formulas F of a special from in T (S) when we use it for super logic programs. PROPOSITION 2.10 (LEAST STATIC EXPANSION). Every knowledge base T has a least static expansion, namely, the least fixed point T of the monotonic default closure operator T .
More precisely, the least static expansion T of T can be constructed as follows. Let T 0 = T and suppose that T α has already been defined for any ordinal number α < β. If β = α + 1 is a successor ordinal then define:
where F ranges over all formulae in L not . Else, if β is a limit ordinal then define T β = α<β T α . The sequence {T α } is monotonically increasing and has a limit T = T λ = T (T λ ), for some ordinal λ.
We were able to show in that for finite knowledge bases, the fixed point is in fact already reached after the first iteration of the default closure operator T . In other words, T = T 1 .
Observe that the least static expansion T of T contains those and only those formulae that are true in all static expansions of T . It constitutes the so called static completion of a knowledge base T .
Definition 2.11 (Static Completion and Static Semantics) . The least static expansion T of a knowledge database T is called the static completion of T . It describes the static semantics of a knowledge base T .
It is time now to discuss some examples. For simplicity, unless explicitly needed, when describing static expansions we ignore nested defaults and list only those elements of the expansion that are relevant to our discussion, thus, for example, skipping such members of the expansion as not (F ∧ ¬F ), not ¬not (F ∧ ¬F ), and so on.
Example 2.12. Consider the knowledge base discussed in Example 2.7:
car. car ∧ not broken → runs.
We already established that T minimally entails ¬broken. As a result, the static completion T of T contains not broken. Consequently, as expected, the static completion T of T derives not broken and runs and thus coincides with the perfect model semantics [Przymusinski 1995a ] of this stratified program [Apt et al. 1988 ].
Example 2.13. Consider a slightly more complex knowledge base T : not broken → runs. not fixed → broken.
In order to iteratively compute its static completion T we let T 0 = T . One easily checks that T 0 |= min ¬fixed. Since
it follows that not fixed ∈ T 1 and therefore broken ∈ T 1 . Since,
it follows that not ¬broken ∈ T 2 . Proposition 2.4 implies ¬not broken ∈ T 2 and thus T 2 |= min ¬runs. Accordingly, since:
we infer that not runs ∈ T 3 . As expected, the static completion T of T , which contains T 3 , asserts that the car is considered not to be fixed and therefore • S. Brass et al. broken and thus is not in a running condition. Again, the resulting semantics coincides with the perfect model semantics of this stratified program. 11
Example 2.14. Consider the following super program P :
Obviously, the answer to the query visit europe ∨ visit australia must be positive, while the answer to the query visit europe ∧ visit australia should be negative. As a result, we expect a positive answer to the queries happy and prudent and a negative answer to the queries bankrupt and disappointed. This means that default negation interprets disjunctions in an exclusive way, as is usual in disjunctive logic programming approaches based on minimal models.
Observe that the query not (visit europe ∧ visit australia) intuitively means "can it be assumed by default that we don't visit both Europe and Australia?" and thus it is different from the query not visit europe ∧ not visit australia, which says "can it be assumed by default that we don't visit Europe and that we don't visit Australia?".
It turns out that the static semantics produces precisely the intended meaning discussed above. Clearly happy must belong to the static completion of P . It is easy to check that ¬visit europe ∨ ¬visit australia:
holds in all minimal models of the program P and therefore not (visit europe ∧ visit australia) must be true in the completion. This proves that prudent must hold in the completion. Moreover, since bankrupt is false in all minimal models not bankrupt must also belong to the completion. Finally, since visit europe ∨ visit australia is true, we infer from Proposition 2.4 that not ¬(visit europe ∨ visit australia) and thus also ¬not (visit europe ∨ visit australia) holds. But then ¬disappointed is minimally entailed, thus not disappointed belongs to the completion.
Remark 2.15. In general, we do not assume the distributive axiom for conjunction:
It is not difficult to prove that for a rational knowledge base T and for any two formulae F and G:
11 It follows from our result in that not runs is in fact already contained in T 1 . This is shown by concluding that equivalences similar to Clark's completion are contained in T 1 .
But together with the axiom in question this would mean
This is too restrictive. For example, given the fact that we can assume by default that we do not drink and drive (that is, T |= not (drink ∧ drive)) at the same time, we do not necessarily want to conclude that we can either assume by default that we don't drink (that is, T |= not (drink)) or assume by default that we don't drive (that is, T |= not (drive)).
In rational knowledge bases, we only assume not (F ∧ G) if F ∧ G is false in all minimal models. But it might well be that F is true in some, and G is true in some, but they are never true together. So the axiom in question conflicts with the intended meaning of default negation. On some evenings we drink, on some we drive, but we never do both. If this is all the information we have, not (drink ∧ drive) should be implied, but neither not (drink) nor not (drive) should follow.
Note, however, that the implication in one direction, namely not (F ∧ G) ← not F ∨ not G, easily follows from our axioms. In some specific applications, the inclusion of the distributive axiom for conjunction may be justified; in such cases it may simply be added to the above listed axioms.
Basic Properties of Super Logic Programs
The next theorem summarizes properties of super programs. It is an immediate consequence of results established in Przymusinski [ , 1998 : THEOREM 2.16 (BASIC PROPERTIES OF SUPER PROGRAMS).
(1) Let P be any super logic program and let P be its static completion. For any formula F , P |= not F iff P |= min ¬F .
(2) Let P be any super logic program and let P be its static completion. For any two formulae F and G holds:
(3) Every affirmative super program has a consistent static completion. In particular, this applies to all disjunctive logic programs. (4) For normal logic programs, static semantics coincides with the well-founded semantics [Van Gelder et al. 1991 ]. More precisely, there is a one-to-one correspondence between consistent static expansions of a normal program and its partial stable models [Przymusinski 1990 ]. Under this correspondence, (total) stable models [Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988] (also called answer sets) correspond to those consistent static expansions that satisfy the axiom not A ∨ not ¬A, for every objective atom A. (5) For positive disjunctive logic programs, static semantics coincides with the minimal model semantics.
Adding Strong Negation to Knowledge Bases
As pointed out in Gelfond and Lifschitz [1991] and Alferes et al. [1998] , in addition to default negation, not F , nonmonotonic reasoning requires another type of negation -F , which is similar to classical negation ¬F but does not satisfy the law of the excluded middle (see Alferes et al. [1998] for more information). Strong negation -F can be easily added to super logic programs by: (1) Extending the original objective language L by adding to it new objective propositional symbols -A, called strong negation atoms, for all A ∈ At L . (2) Adding to the super logic program the following strong negation clause, for any strong negation atom -A that appears in it: A ∧ -A → false, which says that A and -A cannot be both true. Since the addition of strong negation clauses simply results in a new super logic program, our results apply to programs with strong negation as well.
FIXED POINT CHARACTERIZATION OF STATIC COMPLETIONS
Due to Proposition 2.5, we can consider the language of super logic programs to be restricted to the subset L * not ⊆ L not , which is the propositional logic over the following set of atoms:
In particular, the language L * not does not allow any nesting of default negations: Default negation can only be applied to conjunctions of objective atoms. As a special case, we also allow the "empty conjunction", so not (true) is contained in L * not . The conjunction E can be treated as a set-because of the invariance inference rule not E 1 and not E 2 must have the same truth value if E 1 and E 2 only differ in the sequence or multiplicity of the atoms in the conjunction. In this way, if At L is finite, only a finite number of default negation atoms must be considered.
In order to answer queries about a super program P , we only need to know which formulae of the restricted language L * not belong to the static completion of P . In other words, we only need to compute the restriction P |L * not of the static completion P to the language L * not . It would be nice and computationally a lot more feasible to be able to compute this restriction without having to first compute the full completion, which involves arbitrarily deeply nested default negations and thus is inherently infinite even for finite programs. The following result provides a positive solution to this problem in the form of a much simplified syntactic fixed point characterization of static completions. In the next section we provide yet another solution in the form of a model-theoretic characterization of static completions. THEOREM 3.1 (SYNTACTIC FIXED-POINT CHARACTERIZATION). The restriction of the static completion P of a finite super program P to the language L * not can be constructed as follows. Let P 0 = P and suppose that P n has already been defined for some natural number n. Define P n+1 as follows:
where E i 's range over all conjunctions of objective atoms and Cn denotes the standard propositional consequence operator. We allow the special case that E 0 is the empty conjunction (i.e., true) and identify not true with false.
The sequence {P n } is monotonically increasing and has a limit P n 0 = P n 0 +1 , for some natural number n 0 . Moreover, P n 0 = P |L * not , i.e., P n 0 is the restriction of the static completion of P to the language L * not . PROOF. Contained in the Appendix C.
The above theorem represents a considerable simplification over the original characterization of static completions given in Proposition 2.10. First of all, instead of using the modal consequence operator Cn not , only the standard propositional consequence operator Cn is used. Moreover, instead of ranging over the set of all (arbitrarily deeply nested) formulae of the language L not it involves only conjunctions of objective atoms. These two simplifications greatly enhance the implementability of static semantics of finite programs. On the other hand, due to the restriction to the language L * not , we cannot expect the fixed point to be reached in just one step, as would be the case with the more powerful operator T (S) ].
MODEL-THEORETIC CHARACTERIZATION OF STATIC COMPLETIONS
In this section, we complement Theorem 3.1 by providing a model-theoretic characterization of static completions of finite super programs. More precisely, we characterize models of static completions restricted to the narrower language L * not . The resulting characterization was directly used in a prototype implementation of a query answering interpreter for static semantics described in the next section. (1) Let OBJ be the set of all propositional valuations of the objective atoms At L . (2) Let N OT be the set of all propositional valuations of the default negation atoms {not ( p 1 ∧ · · · ∧ p n ) : p i ∈ At L } that interpret not (true) as false. 12 (3) We call an interpretation I of the language L * not , that is, a valuation of At L ∪ {not ( p 1 ∧ · · · ∧ p n ) : p i ∈ At L }, a reduced interpretation and write it as as I = I obj ∪ I not with I obj ∈ OBJ and I not ∈ N OT . (4) In order to emphasize the difference, we sometimes call an interpretation I of the complete language L not , that is, a valuation for At L ∪ {not (F ) : F ∈ L not }, a full interpretation. (5) Given a full interpretation I, we call its restriction I = I obj ∪ I not to the language L * not the reduct of I. Since a reduced interpretation I = I obj ∪ I not assigns truth values to all atoms occurring in a super program, the "is model of" relation between such interpretations and super programs is well defined. We call
such that I = I obj ∪ I not is also a model of P . This is completely compatible with the corresponding notion for full interpretations.
Our goal is to characterize the reducts of the full models of the static completion P of a finite super program P . In fact, once we have the possible interpretations of the default atoms, finding the objective parts of the reducts is easy. The idea of how to compute such possible interpretations is closely related to Kripke structures (which is not surprising for a modal logic; for more details see Appendix A). The worlds in such a Kripke structure are marked with interpretations of the objective atoms At L , and the formula not ( p 1 ∧ · · · ∧ p n ) is true in a world w if and only if ¬( p 1 ∧ · · · ∧ p n ) is true in all worlds w , which can be "seen" from w. Due to the consistency axiom, every world w must see at least one world w . The static semantics ensures that every world w sees only worlds marked with minimal models. So given a set O of (objective parts of) minimal models, an interpretation I not of the default atoms is possible if and only if there is some subset O ⊆ O (namely the interpretations in the worlds w ) such that
depends on the possible interpretations of the default atoms (since a minimal model contains an objective part and a default part). So when we restrict the possible interpretations for the default negation atoms, we also get less minimal models. This results in a fixed-point computation, formalized by the following operators: (1) The operator P : 2 N OT → 2 OBJ yields objective parts of minimal models given possible interpretations of the default atoms. For every N ⊆ N OT , let
(2) Let O ⊆ OBJ and I not ∈ N OT . We call I not given by O iff for every p 1 , . . . , p n ∈ At L :
(3) The operator P : 2 OBJ → 2 N OT yields possible interpretations of the default atoms, given objective parts of minimal models. For every O ⊆ OBJ , let
(4) The operator P : 2 N OT → 2 N OT is the composition P := P • P of P and P .
Note that the additional constraint in the definition of P (that it must be possible to extend I not to a model of P ) is trivially satisfied for affirmative programs-programs having at least one head literal in every rule. Now we are ready to state the main result of this section. (1) The operator P is monotone (in the lattice of subsets of N OT with the order ⊇) and thus its iteration beginning from the set N OT (all interpretations of the default atoms, the bottom element of this lattice) has a fixed point N .
(2) N consists exactly of all I not ∈ N OT that are default parts of a full model
PROOF. Contained in the Appendix B.
Example 4.4. Let us consider the following logic program P :
Until the last step of the iteration, it suffices to consider only those default atoms that occur in P and thus have influence on the objective atoms. But for the sake of demonstration, we start with the set N OT containing all eight possible valuations of the three default atoms not p, not q, and not r (however, we do not consider conjunctive default atoms here). These default interpretations can be extended to the minimal reduced models listed in the following table. Note that models numbered 6 to 10 are equal to models numbered 1 to 5, except that not p is true in them (this shows that not p is really superfluous at this stage).
No. not p not q not r p q r 1. false false false false false false 2. false false true true false false 3. false false true false true true 4. false true false false true true 5. false true true false true true 6. true false false false false false 7. true false true true false false 8. true false true false true true 9. true true false false true true 10. true true true false true true For instance, when not q and not r are both interpreted as false, p, q and r are false in a minimal model. If not q is interpreted as true, q and r are true and p is false by minimality. If not q is false and not r is true, there are two possibilities for a minimal model: either p can be true, or q and r must both be true. So there are only three possible valuations for the objective parts of Note that although there is a minimal model in which p, q, and r are all false, there can be other minimal models based on different interpretations of the default atoms. Now the above three interpretations are the input for the next application of P . Of course, from every minimal objective interpretation we immediately get a possible default interpretation if we translate the truth of p to the falsity of not p and so on. But we can also combine minimal objective parts conjunctively and let not p be true only if ¬ p is true in all elements of some set of minimal models. Thus, P P (N OT ) is: not p not q not r true true true false true true true false false false false false This means that only the models numbered 1, 5, 6, 10 remain possible given the current knowledge about the defaults. Their objective parts are: p q r false false false false true true Finally, p is false in all of these models, so not p must be assumed, and only the following two valuations of the default atoms are possible in the fixed point N : not p not q not r true true true true false false
The reduced models of the least static expansion P consist therefore of all reduced interpretations that include one of these two default parts and are models of P itself.
Obviously, computing the reduct of a full interpretation is easy. Conversely, in the Appendix, Definition B.1, we define a Kripke structure that allows us to extend the reduced interpretations to full interpretations, which are models of the static completion. However, let us observe that not all full models of the least static expansion can be reconstructed in this way. Instead, we obtain only one representative from every equivalence class with the same reduct. For example, one can easily verify that the program P := {p ← not p} has infinitely many different full models (see Example A.6 in the Appendix).
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MODEL-THEORETIC CHARACTERIZATION
We implemented a query-answering interpreter for super logic programs under the static semantics that is based on the above model-theoretic characterization. 13 The interpreter has a Web interface, so it is not necessary to install it locally in order to try it.
Parsing and Clause Transformation
As mentioned before, the interpreter does not require clause form. One can use the following logical operators: Default negation can only be used in negative context, and inside default negation, only disjunction and conjunction are permitted. As in Prolog, atoms are sequences of letters, digits, and underscores that start with a lowercase letter. Alternatively, one can use any sequence of characters enclosed in single quotes. Every formula must end in a full stop ".". For instance, the last line of Example 2.14 would be entered as:
disappointed <-not(visit_europe | visit_australia).
The first task of the program is to read the input, check it for syntactical correctness, and translate it into clauses as shown in Proposition 2.5. This is done with standard techniques. For instance, the above input formula is internally represented as disappointed <-not(visit_europe), not(visit_australia).
Intelligent Grounding
As mentioned above, the current implementation permits rules with variables, but every variable must appear in a positive body literal ("allowedness", "rangerestriction"). For instance, the rule
is syntactically valid, since X appears in q(1,X). This check is done after the clause transformation, so "positive body literal" is not literally required in the input. As in Prolog, variables start with an uppercase letter, and the anonymous 13 See http://www.informatik.uni-halle.de/∼brass/slp/. Actually, there are two implementations: A prototype written in Prolog (1325 lines, 608 lines of code), and a version with Web user interface and better performance written in C++ (21809 lines, 10201 lines of code). The source code of both versions is freely available. The C++ version is still being further developed. variable "_" is also understood. Predicate arguments can be atoms, integers, or variables. Function symbols (term/list constructors) are not permitted in order to ensure that the ground instantiation is finite. However, our implementation does not compute the complete ground instantiation of the input program, since this will often be prohibitively large. Instead, the set of derivable conditional facts is computed:
Definition 5.1 (Conditional Fact). Conditional facts are formulae of the form
where the A i are objective atoms (positive ground literals) the C i are conjunctions of objective atoms (positive ground literals), k ≥ 0, and n ≥ 0. In the following, we treat head and body of conditional facts as sets of literals, and write them as
So conditional facts are rules without positive body literals, and because of the allowedness condition, they also cannot contain variables. Conditional facts were introduced in Bry [1989 Bry [ , 1990 and Dung and Kanchanasut [1989] .
The derivation is done with the hyperresolution operator, which is a generalization of the standard T P -operator. In the non-disjunctive case, the T P -operator applies a rule A ← B 1 ∧ · · · ∧ B m by finding facts B 1 , . . . , B m that match the body literals, that is B i σ = B i for a ground substitution σ , and then deriving the corresponding instance Aσ of the head literal. This is applied for example for the bottom-up evaluation in deductive databases. The generalization for conditional facts is as follows:
Definition 5.2 (Hyperresolution Operator). Let P be a set of super logic program rules as in Proposition 2.5 and F be a set of conditional facts. Then H P (F) is the set of conditional facts
In other words, the positive body literals are matched with any literal in the head 14 of a conditional fact, and then the remaining head literals are added to the corresponding instance of the rule head, as the conditions are added to the corresponding instance of the negative body literals. For example, if the rule
Again, head and body of conditional facts are treated as sets of literals, so duplicate literals are removed. Also for the hyperresolution step itself, the rule is instantiated only as far as there are matching conditional facts.
The hyperresolution operator is applied iteratively until no new conditional facts can be derived. Since there are only finitely many possible ground literals 15 and no duplicates are permitted in head or body, the process is guaranteed to terminate. The importance of the hyperresolution fixpoint is that it has the same minimal models as the original program: THEOREM 5.3. Let P be a super logic program, F 0 := ∅, and F i+1 := H P (F i ), and n be a natural number such that F n+1 = F n . Then the following holds for all Herbrand interpretations I : I is a minimal model of the ground instantiation P * of P if and only if I is a minimal model of F n .
PROOF. See Appendix D.
Of course, for the termination it is important that the implementation discovers if the same conditional fact was derived again. However, nonminimal conditional facts can also be eliminated: A conditional fact A ← C is nonminimal if there is another conditional fact A ← C with A ⊆ A and C ⊆ C, where at least one inclusion is proper. Since in this case the nonminimal conditional fact A ← C is logically implied by the stronger conditional fact A ← C , the set of models is not changed if A ← C is deleted.
Algorithm for Detection for Duplicate and Nonminimal Conditional Facts
Since this redundancy test is needed often, it is essential that it is implemented efficiently. For example Seipel [1994] noted that the elimination of duplicate and subsumed conditional facts took more than half of the total running time of query evaluation.
The subsumption check used in our implementation when a newly derived conditional fact A ← C is inserted into the set F runs in the time O(number of occurrences of literals from A ← C in F).
We use the algorithm from Brass and Dix [1995] that is shown in Figure 1 .
The basic idea is as follows: We store an overlap counter for each existing conditional fact. When a new conditional fact A ← C is produced, we access for each literal in A and C all conditional facts A ← C that contain the same literal and increment the overlap counter of these conditional facts. If the overlap counter (i.e., the number of common literals) reaches the length (number of literals) of A ← C , then A ← C is redundant. Otherwise, if it is equal to the length of A ← C, then A ← C is redundant. It would be inefficient if we had to set the overlap counters of all existing conditional facts back to 0 before each redundancy test. Therefore, we do a "lazy initialization": Each test is assigned a unique number, and we store for each conditional fact the value of the counter at the last time the conditional fact was accessed.
In order to reduce duplicates, our implementation also does a seminaive evaluation by requiring that at least one body literal is matched with a conditional fact that was newly derived in the last hyperresolution round. Although it is still possible that the same conditional fact is derived more than once, it is at least never produced twice in the same way.
Residual Program
In the end, when we apply the model-theoretic characterization for a program that contains n different default negation literals, we need to consider 2 n possible interpretations of these literals and compute minimal models for them. That is obviously very expensive and is only possible for relatively small n.
Therefore, our implementation evaluates the simple cases directly before it starts the expensive algorithm on the remaining difficult cases. This is done by means of reduction operators defined and analyzed in . Positive reduction means that not p can be evaluated to true if p does not occur in any head of a conditional fact:
Definition 5.4 (Positive Reduction). A set F 1 of conditional facts is transformed by positive reduction into a set F 2 of conditional facts if there is an atom p and a conditional fact A ← C ∈ F 1 such that p does not occur in any head in F 1 and
Negative reduction means that not p 1 ∧ · · · ∧ not p k can be evaluated to false if there is an unconditional fact p 1 ∨ · · · ∨ p k ← true:
Definition 5.5 (Negative Reduction). A set F 1 of conditional facts is transformed by negative reduction into a set F 2 of conditional facts if there is
For instance, in Example 2.14 there is an unconditional fact visit europe ∨ visit australia.
As mentioned above, the last rule in that example is internally represented as disappointed ← not (visit europe) ∧ not (visit australia).
It can be deleted because its condition can never be true. In the example, this also eliminates two default negation atoms, which means that fewer interpretations must be considered in the next step of the algorithm.
The current version of our implementation does not evaluate default negation literals that contain conjunctions of atoms. Since the reduction step is only an optimization, this is possible: negations of conjunctions remain for the general algorithm. But we of course plan to strengthen these optimizations in future versions. The more default negations can be eliminated with relatively cheap transformations, the less important it becomes that the algorithm for the general case is expensive.
Applying negative reduction can make positive reduction applicable, and vice versa. The two transformations are applied as long as possible, and the result is called the residual program. It is uniquely determined; the exact sequence of applications of the two transformations is not important. The reduction in the size of the program and the number of distinct default negations can be significant. For instance, no default negations remain if the input program is stratified and nondisjunctive.
Negative reduction can be implemented with a method that is very similar to the overlap counting shown above for the elimination of nonminimal clauses. Positive reduction is implemented by managing for each objective atom a counter for the number of occurrences in conditional fact heads, as well as a list of atoms for which this counter is 0.
Note that positive and negative reduction do change the set of minimal models, since even if there is the fact p, the interpretation of not p in a minimal model is arbitrary. Only the static semantics ensures that not p is false in this case. The following simple cumulation theorem ensures that positive and negative reduction as well as other such optimizations do not change the static semantics:
THEOREM 5.6 (INVARIANCE OF STATIC SEMANTICS).
(1) Let T be a knowledge base with T |= min ¬F . Then T and T ∪ {not F } have the same static expansions.
(2) Let T 1 and T 2 be knowledge bases with Cn not (T 1 ) = Cn not (T 2 ). Then T 1 and T 2 have the same static expansions.
For instance, consider the program { p ← not q}. Since q is false in all minimal models, we can add not q by (1) without changing the static semantics. Both formulas together are logically equivalent to { p, not q}. By (2), this does not change the static semantics. Finally, since also { p} alone implies minimally ¬q, by (1) we get that { p} has the same static semantics as { p, not q}. This proves that the given program can indeed be reduced to { p} (an example of positive reduction).
For an example of negative reduction, consider the program T 1 :
Negative reduction transforms this program into T 2 = {p ∨ q}. In order to show that this does not change the static semantics, we apply part (2) of the theorem. We must show that T 2 is Cn not -equivalent to T 1 : Proposition 2.4 tells us that not (¬( p ∨ q)) is contained in Cn not (T 2 ), and then we also get that ¬not ( p ∨ q) ∈ Cn not (T 2 ) (by Proposition 2.4, the invariance inference rule (IR) and propositional consequences). By applying the distributive axiom (DA) ¬(not p ∧ not q) follows. But now the rule s ← not p ∧ not q ∧ not r is a propositional consequence, and therefore also contained in Cn not (T 2 ).
COROLLARY 5.7. Positive and negative reduction do not change the static semantics of a program.
Application of the Model-Theoretic Characterization
We apply the definition of the operators P and P from Section 4 quite literally. Of course, we use the residual program F, not the input program P .
As mentioned before, it suffices to consider only those default negation atoms that occur explicitly in the residual program. We call these the "critical" default negation atoms. Other default atoms have no influence on the minimal models and we can always extend a valuation of the critical default atoms consistently to a valuation of all default atoms. The objective atoms that occur inside the default negations in the residual program are called the critical objective atoms. The algorithm shown in Figure 2 computes the static interpretations for the critical default negation atoms: the fixed point N of F (reduced to critical default negation atoms). The fixpoint computation starts with the set of all possible interpretations for the critical default negation atoms. This is the most expensive part of the algorithm, so real improvements must attack this problem. In order to keep at least the memory complexity in reasonable limits the set N is materialized only after the first filtering step (application of F ). Without this optimization, the first half of the procedure static(F) could simply be replaced by assigning N all possible interpretations. Now the fixpoint computation starts (the while-loop in Figure 2 ). In each step, first the set O = F (N ) of minimal models, reduced to the objective atoms is computed. The default negation part of each such minimal model must be an element of N .
Our implementation computes O = F (N ) as follows: For each default negation interpretation in N , we evaluate the conditions of the conditional facts in the residual program and get a set D of positive disjunctions. For this, any minimal model generator can be used. We use the algorithm explained in the next subsection. A nice feature of it is that it computes interpretations for only the critical atoms-those objective atoms that appear inside default negations in the residual program. Minimal model generators proposed in the literature are, for example, Bry and Yahya [1996] , Niemelä and Simons [1996] , and Niemelä [1996] .
Once we have computed O, interpretations are eliminated from N that do not satisfy the condition of F (O). However, it would be very inefficient to consider all subsets O ⊆ O, as required in Definition 4.2. In order to check whether a given interpretation I not of the default atoms is selected by F , only the maximal O is of interest. It is the set of all I obj ∈ O that satisfy, for every default atom, the condition:
if I not |= not ( p 1 ∧ · · · ∧ p n ), then I obj |= ¬( p 1 ∧ · · · ∧ p n ).
Obviously, the inclusion of other I obj into O would immediately destroy the required property, namely that I not is the "intersection" of all models in O :
Of course, it must also be tested that the set O is nonempty. In the procedure possible shown in Figure 2 , the set O is not explicitly constructed, but instead the interpretation I ∩ is constructed as the intersection of all elements of O .
Computation of Minimal Models
In order to compute F (N ), we must compute the objective parts of minimal models, of which the default negation part is one of the interpretations in N . As explained above, we do this by looping over the interpretations I not ∈ N , evaluating the conditions C of the formulas A ← C ∈ F in I not , and computing minimal models of the resulting positive disjunctions of objective atoms. 16 The algorithm that is used to compute minimal models of these disjunctions is shown in Figure 3 . We only compute the truth values of critical objective atoms: objective atoms that appear inside default negations in F. 17 Of course, it is important that this partial interpretation can be extended to a total minimal model. So let p be a critical objective atom that is not yet assigned a truth value. The two simple cases are: (1) p does not appear in any disjunction in D: Then p 16 One "last minute" idea was to directly compute minimal models of F, which could be done with an algorithm similar to the one shown in Figure 3 . This might relieve us from the need to consider exponentially many interpretations, but depending on the given rules, it might backtrack over even more different cases. Improvements in this direction are the subject of future research. 17 The procedure modgen shown in Figure 3 can assign "false" to additional (non-critical) objective atoms, if this is required as a reason for a critical atom being true. must be false in every minimal model. (2) p appears as a (non-disjunctive) fact in D: Then p must be true in all minimal models.
The difficult case is when p appears in one or more proper disjunctions. Then it can be true or false, and we backtrack over the different possibilities (the backtracking is simulated with local variables and "call by value" parameters in Figure 3 ; in the actual implementation, several stacks are used). The model construction is based on the following theorem: THEOREM 5.8. Let D be a set of disjunctions of objective atoms, which does not contain the empty disjunction false, and which does not contain two disjunctions A and A , such that A ⊂ A (i.e., A is nonminimal). Let I be a partial interpretation such that atoms interpreted as false do not appear in D and atoms interpreted as true appear as facts in D. Let p be an atom that appears in the proper disjunction p 1 ∨ · · · ∨ p i−1 ∨ p ∨ p i+1 ∨ · · · ∨ p n (and possibly more such disjunctions). Then
(1) There is a minimal model of D that extends I and interprets p as false.
(2) There is a minimal model of D that extends I and interprets p as true and p 1 , . . . , p i−1 , p i+1 , . . . , p n as false. First, p can be false. In order to ensure that the theorem is again applicable for the next atom, we eliminate p from all disjunctions in D (which also might eliminate further disjunctions that now become nonminimal). Alternatively, p can be true. However, p can only be true in a minimal model if for one of the disjunctions in which p appears, all the remaining atoms are false. This ensures that there is a reason why p must be true. Again, the assigned truth values are reflected by changing the set of disjunctions: p is added as a fact and p 1 , . . . , p i−1 , p i+1 , . . . , p n are removed from all disjunctions. This might make disjunctions in D nonminimal, they are removed with the same overlap counting technique as shown in Figure 1 . In this way, assumed truth values are immediately propagated in the disjunctions, which often makes truth values of further critical atoms unique.
The algorithm can also be understood as applying a generalization of Clark's completion to disjunctions: One treats the disjunction p 1 ∨ · · · ∨ p n like the n rules p i ← ¬p 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬p i−1 ∧ ¬p i+1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬p n and then applies the standard completion (which basically translates ← to ↔). Whereas in general, Clark's completion does not correspond to minimal models, in this particular case, the completion enforces exactly the minimal models . For instance, suppose that p appears in the disjunctions p ∨ q and p ∨ r ∨ s. Then the completion contains the formula p ↔ ¬q ∨ (¬r ∧ ¬s).
The above model generation algorithm distinguishes three cases:
(1) p is false. Then it is removed from the disjunctions, so q and r ∨ s are assumed.
(2) p is true and q is false.
(3) p is true and r and s are both false.
In summary, nice features of the algorithm are:
(1) It never runs into dead ends: All assumed truth values are indeed possible.
(2) No additional minimality test for the generated models is needed.
(3) It can generate partial minimal models-truth value assignments for any subset of the atoms that can be extended to minimal models. (4) The space complexity is polynomial in the size of the input disjunctions.
On the negative side, the algorithm may generate the same model several times.
Query Evaluation
Queries are written in the form ? p(X), q(X,b), not r(X).
They are internally handled by adding a rule with the special predicate $answer in the head:
$answer(X) <-p(X), q(X,b), not r(X).
It is also possible to specify the answer variables explicitly, for example ? X: q(X,Y).
Then only values for X will be printed:
With these additional rules, the hyperresolution fixpoint is computed as usual. When positive reduction is applied, and when minimal models are generated, conditional facts that contain $answer in the head are ignored. Conditional facts in the residual program with only $answer literals in the head correspond to possible answers. Their conditions are evaluated in each of the models in N . If the condition is true in all I not ∈ N , the corresponding answer is printed.
Note that disjunctive answers are possible. Consider the program p(a) | p (b) .
Then the answer for the query ? p(X) will be X=a | X=b. This means that the disjunction of the corresponding instances of the query follows from the static semantics of the program. The implementation can also print the fixed point N of F , that is all static interpretations of the default negation literals. Normally, only the truth values of the critical negations are shown, but one can add further default negation literals if one wants to see their truth values. This is done by adding a command of the form ! not p(a).
RELATED WORK
Extended Logic Programs by Lloyd and Topor
The first attempt to generalize the syntax of logic programs is due to Lloyd and Topor [1984 , 1985 , 1986 . They allow arbitrary formulae in bodies of clauses, which is especially important in order to map database queries and view definitions into logic programming rules. However, the head of a rule must still be a single atom. Furthermore, their semantics differentiates between an atom occurring in the head and its negation occurring in the body, whereas our semantics is invariant under logical equivalences.
Lloyd and Topor use Clark's completion for defining the meaning of default negation, whereas the static semantics extends the well-founded semantics. We have not yet treated quantifiers in the formulae of knowledge bases, but all other normalization transformations of Lloyd and Topor work as well for our semantics. This means that if Lloyd and Topor had used the WFS instead of Clark's completion, they could have come up with a special case of the static semantics (restricted to formulae of the form A ← W ). 
Disjunctive Stable Semantics
The disjunctive stable semantics (answer sets) is the most popular semantics proposed earlier for disjunctive programs [Przymusinski 1990; Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991] . Its main problem is that it is inconsistent for some very intuitive programs, such as:
Here we should at least be able to conclude paid and not angry, and the static semantics gives us just that. In general, the static semantics is always consistent for disjunctive logic programs.
In addition to the fact that stable semantics is contradictory for some very simple and natural programs, it also suffers from a number of structural problems. In particular, the stable semantics does not satisfy the relevance property-answering a query does not depend only on the call graph below that query [Brass and Dix 1997; Dix 1995a] , and it is not compositional (or modular), a highly desirable property for software engineering and KR [Bry 1996; Bugliesi et al. 1994; Teusink and Etalle 1996] . The static semantics has both of these nice structural properties. Thus methods for query optimization based on the dependency graph can be applied and may reduce the overall computation.
Needless to say, we do not claim that the static semantics should replace the disjunctive stable semantics. As is the case with normal logic programs, there are some application domains for which the disjunctive stable semantics seems to be better suited to represent their intended meaning [Cholewiński et al. 1995] . However, we do claim that the static semantics is a very natural and well-behaved extension of the well-founded semantics to disjunctive programs and beyond. Because of the importance of the well-founded semantics for normal programs, it is of great importance to find the its proper extension(s) to more general theories.
Well-Founded Circumscriptive Semantics
Our work is also related to the approach presented in You and Yuan [1993] where the authors defined the well-founded circumscriptive semantics for disjunctive programs. They introduced the concept of minimal model entailment with fixed interpretation of the default atoms and defined the semantics of T as the minimal models of T that satisfy the limit of the following sequence: W 0 = ∅ and W n+1 := W n ∪ {¬not p : T ∪ W n |= p} ∪ {not p : T ∪ W n |= min ¬ p} (this is a translation into our own notation). In the definition of the static fixpoint operator T (see Proposition 2.10), negations of default negations are not directly assumed. But in contrast to the well-founded circumscriptive semantics, which only assumes the default negation of propositions, the static semantics assumes the default negation of arbitrary propositional formulae. With Proposition 2.4 it follows that if T ∪ {not F : T n |= min ¬F } implies F , then also ¬not F is contained in T n+1 = T (T n ). With this, it is easy to see that W n ⊆ T n . So the default negation part of the well-founded circumscriptive semantics is weaker than that of the static semantics. The reason is that the static semantics assumes negations of arbitrary formulae, not only of atoms. For example in Theorem 3.1 it is really necessary that implications between default negation atoms are assumed. For instance, in Example 4.4, the static semantics first derives not q ↔ not r and then not p follows. However, in the well-founded circumscriptive semantics the limit of the sequence W n is the empty set: Nothing becomes known about the default negation literals.
Another difference between the two approaches is that the well-founded circumscriptive semantics permits only minimal models of the objective atoms. The static semantics considers minimal models when deciding which default negations to assume, but if one does not use default negation, one gets standard propositional logic. For instance, let P = {p}. If also q belongs the language, the well-founded circumscriptive semantics implies ¬q and not q, whereas the static semantics implies not q, but not ¬q. Of course, both semantics imply p and ¬not p.
Disjunctive Logic Programming Systems
In addition to the DisLoP project in Koblenz, there is a similar project on disjunctive logic programming at the Technical University of Vienna called dlv (see Eiter et al. [1997 Eiter et al. [ , 1998 ). While DisLoP concentrated on a disjunctive extension of the well-founded semantics (D-WFS), dlv computes stable models (answer sets) for both the disjunctive and the non-disjunctive cases. It is a knowledge representation system, which offers front-ends to several advanced KR formalisms. The kernel language, which extends disjunctive logic programming by true negation and integrity constraints, allows for representing complex knowledge base problems in a highly declarative fashion [Eiter et al. 1998 ]. The project also incorporates modular evaluation techniques along with linguistic extensions to deal with quantitative information [Buccafurri et al. 1997 ].
Nested Rules
Recently, Lifschitz et al. [1998] introduced nested expressions in the heads and bodies of rules. Also nested negation as failure is supported; which is excluded in super logic programs. Their semantics is based on answer sets (also called stable models), whereas in our framework, we build upon the well-founded semantics.
In Greco et al. [1998] nested rules are also allowed in rule heads. The authors show that, in terms of expressive power, they can capture the full second level of the polynomial hierarchy (which is also true for other approaches). 
Other Logics
There are also successful approaches to generalizing logic programming languages by using intuitionistic, linear, or higher order logics [Hodas and Miller 1994; Nadathur and Miller 1990] . These extensions seem somewhat orthogonal to our treatment of negation in the context of arbitrary propositional formulas.
CONCLUSION
We introduced the class of super programs as a subclass of the class of all nonmonotonic knowledge bases. We showed that this class of programs properly extends the classes of disjunctive logic programs, logic programs with strong (or "classical") negation and arbitrary propositional theories. We demonstrated that the semantics of super programs constitutes an intuitively natural extension of the semantics of normal logic programs. When restricted to normal logic programs, it coincides with the well-founded semantics, and, more generally, it naturally corresponds to the class of all partial stable models of a normal program.
Subsequently, we established two characterizations of the static semantics of finite super programs, one of which is syntactic and the other model-theoretic, which turned out to lead to procedural mechanisms allowing its computation. Due to the restricted nature of super programs, these characterizations are significantly simpler than those applicable to arbitrary nonmonotonic knowledge bases.
We used one of these characterizations as a basis for the implementation of a query-answering interpreter for super programs which is available on the WWW. We noted that while no such computational mechanism can be efficient, due to the inherent NP-hardness of the problem of computing answers to just positive disjunctive programs, they can become efficient when restricted to specific subclasses of programs and queries. Moreover, further research may produce more efficient approximation methods.
The class of nonmonotonic knowledge bases, and, in particular, the class of super programs, constitutes a special case of a much more expressive nonmonotonic formalism called the Autoepistemic Logic of Knowledge and Beliefs, AELB, introduced earlier in Przymusinski [1994, 1998] . AELB isomorphically includes the well-known nonmonotonic formalisms of Moore's Autoepistemic Logic and McCarthy's Circumscription. Via this embedding, the semantics of super programs is clearly linked to other well-established nonmonotonic formalisms.
The proposed semantic framework for super programs is sufficiently flexible to allow various application-dependent extensions and modifications. We have already seen in Theorem 2.16 that by assuming an additional axiom we can produce the stable semantics instead of the well-founded semantics. By adding the distributive axiom for conjunction we can obtain a semantics that extends the disjunctive stationary semantics of logic programs introduced in Przymusinski [1995a] . Many other modifications and extensions are possible including variations of the notion of a minimal model resulting in inclusive, instead of exclusive, interpretation of disjunctions [Przymusinski 1995b ].
APPENDIX
A. KRIPKE MODELS OF STATIC EXPANSIONS
Before we prove the model-theoretic characterization (Theorem 4.3) , we prove here a Theorem that easily allows us to construct models of the least static expansion from Kripke structures. It is used as a lemma in the proof to Theorem 4.3, but it is of its own interest. Although we later need only super programs and reduced models, in this section we allow arbitrary belief theories and consider full models.
In order to be precise and self-contained, let us briefly repeat the definition of Kripke structures [Marek and Truszczyński 1993] . Since our axioms entail the normality axiom, it suffices to consider normal Kripke structures:
Definition A.1 (Kripke Structure). A (normal) Kripke structure is a triple K = (W, R, V ) consisting of (1) a non-empty set W , the elements w ∈ W are called worlds, (2) a relation R ⊆ W × W , the "visibility relation" (if R(w, w ) we say that world w sees world w ), and (3) a mapping V : W → OBJ , which assigns to every world w a valuation I obj = V (w) of the objective atoms At L .
Definition A.2 (Truth of Formulas in Worlds). The validity of a formula F in a world w given Kripke structure K = (W, R, V ) is defined by
(2) If F is a negation ¬G, then (K, w) |= F :⇐⇒ (K, w) |= G.
(3) If F is a disjunction G 1 ∨ G 2 , then (K, w) |= F :⇐⇒ (K, w) |= G 1 or (K, w) |= G 2 (and further propositional connectives as usual). (4) If F is a default negation atom not (G), then (K, w) |= F :⇐⇒ for all w ∈ W with R(w, w ): (K, w ) |= G. Now given such a Kripke structure K, we get from every world w a propositional interpretation I = K(w) of L not , that is a valuation of At L ∪{not (F ) : F ∈ L not }: We simply make an objective or belief atom A true in I iff (K, w) |= A. Since the propositional connectives are defined in a Kripke structure like in standard propositional logic, we obviously have I |= F ⇐⇒ (K, w) |= F for all F ∈ L not . THEOREM A.3 (KRIPKE STRUCTURES YIELD STATIC EXPANSIONS). Let T be an arbitrary belief theory and K = (W, R, V ) be a Kripke structure satisfying
(1) For every w ∈ W , there is a w ∈ W with R(w, w ) (consistency).
(2) For every w ∈ W , (K, w) |= T , that is the interpretation I = K(w) is a model of T . Then T := {F ∈ L not : for every w ∈ W : (K, w) |= F } is a static expansion of T .
PROOF. We have to show that T = Cn not T ∪ {not F : T |= min ¬F } . The fact that T ⊂ T follows immediately from the second assumption. First we prove that T is closed under Cn not :
(1) Consistency Axioms: Let any w ∈ W be given. The first part (K , w) |= not (false) is trivial, because for any w ∈ W we have (K, w ) |= false. Second, we have to show (K, w) |= ¬not (true). By the first requirement of the theorem, there is w ∈ W with R(w, w ). Now (K, w ) |= true, therefore (K, w) |= not (true), i.e., (K, w) |= ¬not (true).
(2) Distributive Axiom: We have to show that for all formulas F, G ∈ L not and all w ∈ W that the distributive axiom holds in w:
. This follows simply from applying the definitions:
Closure under propositional consequences: Let F ∈ L not a formula which is a propositional consequence of F 1 , . . . , F n ∈ T . Now F i ∈ T means that (K, w) |= F i for every w ∈ W . But the formulas valid in one world are closed under propositional consequences, since the meaning of the propositional connectives is defined as in the standard case. So we get (K, w) |= F , and thus F ∈ T .
Now suppose that T |= min ¬F , that is F is false in all minimal models of T . We have to show that not (F ) ∈ T , that is (K, w) |= not (F ) for every w ∈ W . So we have to show (K, w ) |= F for every w ∈ W with R(w, w ). Let such a w be given, and let I = K(w ). By the last condition of the theorem, we know that I is a minimal model of T . By construction, it is also a model of T , and since T ⊆ T , there can be no smaller model. Thus, I is a minimal model of T and therefore satisfies ¬F , that is (K, w ) |= F .
Thus we have shown that Cn not (T ∪ {not F : T |= min ¬F }) ⊆ T . The converse follows from assumption (3) and (4) of the preceding definition.
This theorem gives us a simple way to construct models of the least static expansion T : Obviously, for every w ∈ W , the interpretation I = K(w) is a model of T . But the least static expansion is a subset of every other static expansion, that is T ⊆ T , and therefore we have I |= T . Here, we can construct a Kripke model K with only one world w with the valuation I obj = {¬fixed, broken, ¬runs}. We let this world "see" itself, that is R := {(w, w)}. Then not fixed and not runs are true in (K, w), but not broken is false.
It is, however, also possible to add a world w with a nonminimal valuation I obj = {fixed, broken, runs}. Both worlds can only see w, that is R := {(w, w), (w , w)}, because all seen worlds must be minimal models. This example shows that the static semantics does not imply ¬fixed, but it of course implies not fixed. So the nonmonotonic negation is cleanly separated from the classical negation.
Example A.6. Let us consider the theory P := {p ← not ( p)} corresponding to a well-known logic program. We claimed in Section 4 that the least static expansion P of this program has infinitely many different models. But let us first look at a Kripke structure that generates only two models:
The set of worlds W is {1, 2}, the visibility relation R is {(1, 2), (2, 1)} (each world can see the other one, but not itself), and p is false in world 1 and true in world 2. In world 1, not ( p) is false, and in world 2, it is true.
But there are also quite different Kripke models. The construction in Section 4 will yield:
Note that in world 3, the default atom not ( p) is false, so the interpretation of this world is nonminimal (there is no need to make p true). Thus, there can be no incoming edges.
Let us now finally present the Kripke structure that yields infinitely many models:
Now we of course have to explain that different worlds really yield different interpretations. The trick is that world 1 is the only world in which neither not ( p) nor not (¬ p) are true. Now other worlds can be identified with the number of nested beliefs necessary to get to world 1. So the formula
is true in world n ≥ 2, but in no other world (B stands for not ¬). Each world gives rise to one full model (as explained in Theorem A.3 and Corollary A.4), so the theory { p ← not ( p)} really has infinitely many full models.
B. PROOF OF THE MODEL-THEORETIC CHARACTERIZATION (THEOREM 4.3)
We will first prove that a reduced model I = I obj ∪ I not with I |= P and I not ∈ N can be extended to a full model I of the least static expansion P . Of course, this proof is based on the Kripke structure already mentioned in Section 4:
Definition B.1 (Standard Kripke Model). Let P ⊆ L * not be a super program. We call the Kripke structure K = (W, R, V ) defined as follows the "standard Kripke model" of P . Let N be the greatest fixpoint of P . Then:
(1) The set of worlds W are the reduced interpretations I = I obj ∪ I not we are interested in, that is satisfying I |= P and I not ∈ N . I |= not ( p 1 ∧ · · · ∧ p n ) =⇒ I |= ¬ p 1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬p n .
(3) The valuation V (I ) of a reduced interpretation I = I obj ∪ I not is the objective part I obj .
As before, we denote by K(I ) the full interpretation satisfying the default atoms true in world I :
Now the reduced interpretation I = I obj ∪ I not assigns a truth value to the atoms not ( p 1 ∧ · · · ∧ p n ) and the Kripke structure also assigns a truth value to them. But the construction guarantees that the truth values always agree: LEMMA B.2. For I = (I obj ∪ I not ) ∈ W and all p 1 , . . . , p n ∈ At L :
PROOF. First we show the direction ⇐= : Let I not |= not ( p 1 ∧ · · · ∧ p n ). By the construction, I |= ¬ p 1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬p n holds for all worlds I seen by I , that is satisfying R(I, I ). Thus, K(I ) |= not ( p 1 ∧ · · · ∧ p n ). Now we prove =⇒ by contraposition: Let I not |= not ( p 1 ∧ · · · ∧ p n ). Since N is a fixpoint of P , we have N = P P (N ) . By the definition of P , there is a non-empty O ⊆ P (N ) such that the default atoms true in I not are the intersection of the corresponding true negations in O . Thus, there is I obj ∈ O with I obj |= p 1 ∧ · · · ∧ p n . Furthermore, for all q 1 , . . . , q m with I not |= not (q 1 ∧ · · · ∧ q m ), we have I obj |= ¬q 1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬q m . Now by the definition of P , there is a I not ∈ N such that I = I obj ∪ I not is a minimal model of P . It follows that R(I, I ) holds, that is I sees a world with valuation I obj , in which ¬ p 1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬p n is false. Thus K(I ) |= not ( p 1 ∧ · · · ∧ p n ). PROOF. We show that the conditions of Theorem A.3 are satisfied:
(1) We first have to show that every world I = I obj ∪ I not sees at least one world I . This follows from I not ∈ N , that is I not ∈ P ( P (N ) ). By the definition of P there is a non-empty subset O ⊆ P (N ) such that every I obj ∈ O satisfies for all p 1 , . . . , p n ∈ At L : If the full interpretation I = K(I ) were not a minimal model of P , that is there were a smaller modelÎ of P , then its reductÎ would be a smaller model than I (again using Lemma B.2 in order to conclude that I and I , and thus I andÎ agree on the default atoms). Now Theorem A.3 allows us to conclude that the formulae true in all worlds of W are a static expansion of P . Of course, every I = K(I ) is a model of this static expansion. But the least static expansion P is a subset, so I is also a model of P .
PROOF. This is a simple exercise in applying the axioms of L not : First, we get
by the invariance inference rule. Then we apply the distributive axiom on both sides: Brass et al. This implies propositionally:
Now we insert our precondition and get the required formula. LEMMA B.5. Let P be finite, I be a full model of the least static expansion P, and let I = I obj ∪ I not be its reduct. Then I not ∈ N .
PROOF. We show by induction on k that the default part I not of a model I of the least static expansion P is contained in k P (N OT ). For k = 0 this is trivial, since N OT is the complete set of default interpretations.
Let us assume that I not ∈ k P (N OT ). We have to show that I not is not "filtered out" by one further application of P . Let N := k P (N OT ), O := P (N ), and O := {I obj ∈ O : for every default atom not ( p 1 ∧ · · · ∧ p n ):
if I not |= not ( p 1 ∧ · · · ∧ p n ), then I obj |= ¬ p 1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬p n }.
We will now show that O has the properties required in the definition of P , namely we will show
This implies that O is non-empty because for n = 0 the empty conjunction is logically true. Because of the consistency axiom, I not |= not (true). But then there must be at least one I obj ∈ O , because otherwise the "for all" on the right hand side would be trivially true. Also the direction =⇒ follows trivially from the construction. Now we have to show that for every default atom not ( p 1 ∧ · · · ∧ p n ) that is false in I not , there is I obj ∈ O with I obj |= ¬ p 1 ∨· · ·∨¬ p n . Let not (q i,1 ∧· · ·∧q i,n i ), i = 1, . . . , m, be all default atoms true in I not (containing only the finitely many objective propositions occurring in P ). Since I |= P , the formula m i=1 not (q i,1 ∧ · · · ∧ q i,n i ) → not ( p 1 ∧ · · · ∧ p n ) cannot be contained in P (it is violated by I not and thus by I). But Lemma B.4 shows that the above formula would follow from
Thus, this formula is also not contained in P . But the static semantics requires that not (F ) ∈ P if P |= min ¬F . So if not (F ) ∈ P , there must be a minimal model of P violating ¬F , that is satisfying F . In our case this means that there is a minimal model I of P with I |= ¬q i,1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬q i,n i for i = 1, . . . , m and I |= ( p 1 ∧· · ·∧ p n ), that is I |= ¬ p 1 ∨· · ·∨¬ p n . But by our inductive hypothesis, the default part I not of I is contained in N , and thus the objective part I obj is in O. Since I obj |= ¬q i,1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬q i,n i , it is contained in O . Thus, I obj is the required element. (1) The operator P is monotone (in the lattice of subsets of N OT with the order ⊇) and thus its iteration beginning from the set N OT (all interpretations of the default atoms, the bottom element of this lattice) has a fixed point N . PROOF. The monotonicity of P is obvious: Let N 1 ⊇ N 2 (since we are working with inverse set inclusion, this means that N 1 is below N 2 in the lattice). Then we get P (N 1 ) ⊇ P (N 2 ): any I obj ∈ P (N 2 ) is based on a interpretation I not ∈ N 2 , and since N 2 ⊆ N 1 , we also have I obj ∈ P (N 1 ). Now let O 1 := P (N 1 ) and O 2 := P (N 2 ). From O 1 ⊇ O 2 it also follows that
Part 2 means that for every I not ∈ N OT :
There is a full model I of P with belief part I not ⇐⇒ I not ∈ N . There is a full model I of P with reduct I ⇐⇒ I not ∈ N and I obj ∪ I not |= P .
Here the direction ⇐= is Lemma B.3 and the direction =⇒ follows trivially from Lemma B.5 and P ⊆ P .
Remark B.6. Note that we have used the finiteness of P only in the proof to Lemma B.5. So even in the infinite case, our model-theoretic construction yields models of the least static expansion, but it does not necessarily yield all reduced models. One example, where a difference might occur, is P = {q i ∨ r i : i ∈ IN} ∪ {r i ∨ p : i ∈ IN}. Our model-theoretic construction excludes an interpretation that makes all not (q i ) true and not ( p) false. It seems plausible that P allows such models, because it would need an "infinite implication" to exclude them. But this question needs further research.
C. PROOF OF FIXPOINT CHARACTERIZATION (THEOREM 3.1)
We prove Theorem 3.1 by using the model-theoretic characterization. More specifically, we show that the formulae not (E 1 ) ∧ · · · ∧ not (E m ) → not (E 0 ) contained in P n exactly characterize the default interpretations remaining after n applications of P . First we prove the following lemma, which characterizes minimal models of special knowledge bases. Next, we need the monotonicity of the sequence P n : LEMMA C.2. For every n ∈ IN: P n ⊆ P n+1 .
PROOF. The propositional consequence operator Cn is monotonic and has no influence on the minimal models, so it suffices to show that the sequencê P 0 := P ,P
The proof is by induction on n. The case n = 0 is trivial. For larger n, the inductive hypothesis gives usP n ⊇P n−1 and all formulas inP n \P n−1 contain only default atoms. So Lemma C.1 yields that the minimal models ofP n are a subset of the minimal models ofP n−1 , and thereforeP n−1 |= min ¬E 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬E m → ¬E 0 impliesP n |= min ¬E 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬E m → ¬E 0 , that isP n+1 ⊇P n .
Next, we have the small problem that we must in principle look at infinitely many default negation atoms, although we have required our program to be finite. For instance, not ( p), not ( p ∧ p), and so on are different default atoms, and in general, default interpretations could assign different truth values to them. However, P 1 excludes this: (1) If I not |= not ( p 1 ∧ · · · ∧ p n ) and { p 1 , . . . , p n } ⊆ {q 1 , . . . , q m }, then I not |= not (q 1 ∧ · · · ∧ q m ). (2) I not |= not ( p 1 ∧ · · · ∧ p n ) if some p i ∈ At L does not occur in P .
LEMMA C.4. All I not ∈ N i , i ≥ 1 are regular.
PROOF. (1) Every interpretation
(2) Every minimal model I of P satisfies ¬( p 1 ∧ · · · ∧ p n ) if some p i does not occur in P (because I |= ¬ p i ). But then not ( p 1 ∧ · · · ∧ p n ) ∈ P 1 , and by Lemma C.2 it is contained also in every P n , n ≥ 1.
LEMMA C.5. Let P n not be the set of formulas of the form not (E 1 ) ∧ · · · ∧ not (E m ) → not (E 0 ) contained in P n . Furthermore, let N 0 := N OT and N n+1 := P (N n ). Then for every I = I obj ∪ I not with I |= P: I not |= P n not ⇐⇒ I not ∈ N n . PROOF. The proof is by induction on n. The case n = 0 is trivial, since N 0 = N OT and P 0 = P and anyway we only consider models of P .
(1) " ⇐= ": Let I not ∈ N n+1 = P (N n ). We have to show that I not |= P n+1 not . Suppose that this were not the case, that is I not violates a formula not E 1 ∧ · · · ∧ not E m → not E 0 contained in P n+1 not . This means that I not |= not E i for i = 1, . . . , m, but I not |= not E 0 . By the definition of P , there must be an objective model I obj ∈ P (N n ) (contained in the non-empty O ) such that I obj |= ¬E i for i = 1, . . . , m and I obj |= ¬E 0 . By the definition of P , there must be a default interpretation I not ∈ N n such that I = I obj ∪ I not is a minimal model of P . Then the inductive hypothesis gives us I not |= P n not , and Lemma C.1 allows us to conclude that I is a minimal model of P ∪ P n not and thus of P n . But this means that P n |= min not E 1 ∧ · · · ∧ not E m → not E 0 . Since I is a model of P , the critical formula cannot be contained in P (if E 0 is the empty conjunction and P is not affirmative, this would be syntactically possible). And finally, it cannot be introduced by the Cnoperator, since I is a model of its preconditions. Thus, it is impossible that not E 1 ∧ · · · ∧ not E m → not E 0 is contained in P n+1 not . (2) " =⇒ ": Let I not |= P n+1 not . By Lemma C.2 we have P n not ⊆ P n+1 not , so I not |= P n not , and the inductive hypothesis gives us I not ∈ N n . We have to show that I not is not "filtered out" by one further application of the P -operator. Let O := {I obj ∈ P (N n ) : I obj |= ¬E for all E with I not |= not E}.
We have to show that for every E 0 with I not |= not E 0 there is an I obj ∈ O with I obj |= ¬E 0 . This especially implies that O is non-empty, since I not |= not (true), which is obviously contained in P n+1 not . Now suppose that this were not the case, that is there were an E 0 such that there is no I obj ∈ O with I obj |= ¬E 0 .
Let not (E i ), i = 1, . . . , m, be all belief atoms which are true in I not and satisfy the following conditions (in order to make the set finite): First, the conjunctions E i contain only propositions p ∈ At L occurring in P (which was required to be finite), and second, each E i contains each proposition at most once.
We now prove that not E 1 ∧ · · · ∧ not E m → not E 0 is contained in P n+1 not , which contradicts I not |= P n+1 not . Let I = I obj ∪ I not be any minimal model of P n . We have to show that it satisfies ¬E 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬E m → ¬E 0 . The induction hypothesis gives us I not ∈ N n , and thus I obj ∈ P (N n ). Suppose that I obj |= ¬E i for i = 1, . . . , m, since otherwise the formula is trivially satisfied. Since I is a minimal model and I not is regular, this means that I obj ∈ O (the validity of ¬E 1 , . . . , ¬E m implies the validity of all other ¬E considered in the construction of O ). But we have assumed that no element of O violates ¬E 0 , thus I obj |= ¬E 0 . LEMMA C.6. P n 0 ⊆ P |L * not . PROOF. We show P n not ⊆ P by induction on n (this implies the above statement since P is closed under consequences and P n 0 ⊆ L * not ). For n = 0 this is trivial since P ⊆ P . Now suppose that P n |= min ¬E 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬E m → ¬E 0 . By Theorem 3.8 in ] and the definition of Cn not , P differs from P only by the addition of formulas containing only default atoms plus propositional consequences. By the inductive hypothesis, P n not ⊆ P . Now Lemma C.1 gives us that all minimal models of P are also minimal models of P n , and therefore P |= min ¬E 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬E m → ¬E 0 , that is P |= min ¬E 1 ∧· · ·∧¬E m ∧ E 0 . This means that not (¬E 1 ∧· · ·∧¬E m ∧ E 0 ) ∈ P , and by Lemma B.4 we get that not E 1 ∧ · · · ∧ not E m → not E 0 is contained in P . Now we can complete the proof of Theorem 3.1. First, a fixpoint is reached after a finite number of iterations, because by Lemma C.4 we know that there are only a finite number of "really different" default negation atoms, so after the first iteration (which ensures the regularity) it suffices to consider a finite number of implications not E 1 ∧ · · · ∧ not E m → not E 0 , and the sets P n are monotonically increasing (Lemma C.2).
So we have P n 0 not = P n 0 +1 not and thus N n 0 = N n 0 +1 = N . Now for any reduced interpretation I = I obj ∪ I not : if I |= P n 0 , then I |= P and I |= P n 0 not , and by Lemma C.5 we get I not ∈ N . Now the already proven Theorem 4.3 implies that I is a reduct of a full model of the least static expansion P . But this implies I |= P |L * not . The other direction I |= P |L * not =⇒ I |= P n 0 follows from Lemma C.6.
From the equivalence of P n 0 and P |L * not we get P n 0 = P |L * not , since both sets are closed under propositional consequences: For instance, let F ∈ P n 0 and suppose that F ∈ P |L * not . Since P |L * not is closed under propositional consequences, there must be a reduced interpretation I with I |= P |L * not , but I |= F . This is impossible since we already know that every model of P |L * not is also a model of P n 0 .
Remark C.7. The finiteness of P was used in the proof for I not |= P n not =⇒ I not ∈ N n . This was to be expected, since we strongly conjecture that for infinite programs, the model-theoretic construction does not yield all models of the static completion. However, this does not give us any hint whether Theorem 3.1 might hold for infinite programs. This question is the topic of our future research.
D. PROOFS OF PROPERTIES USED IN THE IMPLEMENTATION
THEOREM 5.3. Let P be a super logic program, F 0 := ∅, and F i+1 := H P (F i ), and n be a natural number such that F n+1 = F n . Then the following holds for all Herbrand interpretations I : I is a minimal model of the ground instantiation P * of P if and only if I is a minimal model of F n .
PROOF. First we show that a (minimal) model of one of P * and F n is also a model of the other:
(1) The conditional facts in H P (F i ) are logical consequences of P * ∪ F i . By induction on i, it follows that F i is implied by P * . Therefore, every model of P * is also a model of F n . (2) Next, we prove that every minimal model of F n is also a model of P * : Suppose that this would not be the case, that is I is a minimal model of F n , but it violates a rule A 1 ∨ · · · ∨ A k ← B 1 ∧ · · · ∧ B m ∧ not C 1 ∧ · · · ∧ not C l in P * . This means that B 1 , . . . , B m are true in I . Since I is a minimal model of F n , F n contains for i = 1, . . . , m a conditional fact A i ← C i that is violated in the interpretation I \ {B i } (that is the interpretation that agrees with I except that B i is false in it). It follows that B i ∈ A i , that A i \ {B i } is false in I , and that C i is true in I (since the default negation literals are treated like new propositions, making B i false does not change any of the default negation literals). Now consider the conditional fact that is derived from the rule instance and the A i ← C i :
Since F n is a fixpoint of H P , this fact is also contained in F n . But this is a contradiction, since it is violated in I . Now let I be a minimal model of P * . (1) shows that it is a model of F n . If it were not minimal, there would be a smaller model I 1 of F n . Then also a minimal model I 0 of F n must exist that is still smaller than (or equal to) I 1 . But by (2) above, I 0 is also a model of P * , which contradicts the assumed minimality of I . Conversely let I be a minimal model of F n . By (2), it is a model of P * . If it were not minimal, there would be a smaller model I 0 of P * , which is by (1) also a model of F n , which again contradicts the assumed minimality of I . LEMMA D.1. Let T 1 be a nonmonotonic knowledge base with T 1 |= min F . Let T 2 be a set of default negation atoms, that is formulae of the form not G with an arbitrary formula G. Then Cn not (T 1 ∪ T 2 ) |= min F .
PROOF. If this were not the case, there was a minimal model I of Cn not (T 1 ∪ T 2 ) which does not satisfy ¬F . Because of T 1 |= min ¬F and T 1 ⊆ Cn not (T 1 ∪ T 2 ), there must be a model I 0 of T 1 that is smaller than I , but not a model of Cn not (T 1 ∪ T 2 ). Since I 0 is smaller than I , it assigns the same truth values to the default negation literals. But then it satisfies T 2 , that is it is a model of T 1 ∪ T 2 . Thus, a violated formula must be one that is added by Cn not . Take the first such formula. It cannot be a propositional consequence, because propositional consequences are by definition satisfied in all models that satisfy the preconditions (and until this first formula, it satisfied all preconditions). But it can also not be added by (CA), (DA), or (IR), because all of these formulae • S. Brass et al. consist only of default negation literals, which are interpreted the same in both models. Therefore, we can conclude I 0 |= Cn not (T 1 , . . . , T 2 ). But that contradicts the assumed minimality of I . THEOREM 5.6. (1) Let T be a knowledge base with T |= min ¬F . Then T and T ∪ {not F } have the same static expansions.
PROOF.
(1) Let T be a static expansion of T . By the lemma above, T |= min ¬F . But then it easily follows that T is also a static expansion of T ∪{not F }: It has to satisfy T = Cn not (T ∪ {not F } ∪ {not G : T |= min ¬G}).
Since T |= min ¬F , the formula not F is contained in the preconditions of Cn not anyway, so the union with {not F } changes nothing. Assume conversely that T is a static expansion of T ∪ {not F }, that is T = Cn not (T ∪ {not F } ∪ {not G : T |= min ¬G}).
Again by the lemma above we get T |= min ¬F . But this means that the preconditions are not changed when we do not explicitly add {not F } to the preconditions: T = Cn not (T ∪ {not G : T |= min ¬G}).
(2) This follows with the following sequence of equations: THEOREM 5.8. Let D be a set of disjunctions of objective atoms, which does not contain the empty disjunction false, and which does not contain two disjunctions A and A , such that A ⊂ A (i.e., A is nonminimal). Let I be a partial interpretation such that atoms interpreted as false do not appear in D and atoms interpreted as true appear as facts in D. Let p be an atom that appears in the proper disjunction p 1 ∨ · · · ∨ p i−1 ∨ p ∨ p i+1 ∨ · · · ∨ p n (and possibly more such disjunctions). Then
(2) There is a minimal model of D that extends I and interprets p as true and p 1 , . . . , p i−1 , p i+1 , . . . , p n as false.
(1) Consider the interpretation I that extends I by interpreting p as false and all remaining atoms as true. Suppose that it were not a model of D, that is it would violate some disjunction in D. Since all atoms that I interprets as false do not appear in D, and all the remaining atoms except p are interpreted as true, the violated disjunction can only be p. But this is a contradiction, since then the proper disjunction p 1 ∨ · · · ∨ p i−1 ∨ p ∨ p i+1 ∨ · · · ∨ p n would not be minimal. Thus, I is a model of D. Then there is also a minimal model I 0 of D that is less than or equal to I . The atoms interpreted as false in I as well as p must be false in I 0 , since it is less or equal to I . The atoms interpreted as true in I appear as facts in D, so they must be true in I 0 .
(2) Consider the interpretation I that extends I by interpreting p as true, the remaining atoms of the disjunction ( p 1 , . . . , p i−1 , p i+1 , . . . , p n ) as false, and all other atoms as true. Suppose that it were not a model of D, that is it would violate some disjunction in D. Since all atoms that I interprets as false do not appear in D, and all the remaining atoms except p 1 , . . . , p i−1 , p i+1 , . . . , p n are interpreted as true, the atoms in the violated disjunction can only be a subset of { p 1 , . . . , p i−1 , p i+1 , . . . , p n }. But this contradicts the assumed minimality of the disjunction p 1 ∨ · · · ∨ p i−1 ∨ p ∨ p i+1 ∨ · · · ∨ p n . Thus, I is a model of D. Then there is also a minimal model I 0 of D that is less than or equal to I . This means that the atoms interpreted as false in I as well as p 1 , . . . , p i−1 , p i+1 , . . . , p n must be false in I 0 . All atoms interpreted as true in I must be true in I 0 , since they appear as facts in D. Finally, p must also be true in I 0 , since otherwise it would violate the disjunction p 1 ∨ · · · ∨ p i−1 ∨ p ∨ p i+1 ∨ · · · ∨ p n .
